The Libya situation being the first intervention in Africa under the R2P was bound to be confronted with some challenges and shortfalls which provided important grounds for altering future humanitarian interventions efforts. Issues such as the decision whether to intervene or not to intervene and when military option was to be considered, how it was to be carried out and by what means had often been constrained by these interconnected factors. Thus, the objective of this research is to assess NATO’S intervention in Libya in order to ascertain if the ingredients that are essential for an effective R2P intervention were suitably applied. A review of literature on the responsibility to protect and the intervention on Libya were therefore examined. The findings of the research reveal that NATO’s intervention in Libya was borne out of humanitarian or just war thesis. However, the long history of western conspiracy against Gaddafi’s administration became apparent in the intervention. Again, the enforcement of the resolution which purports to protect civilians ironically ended up killing more civilians, thus raising further questions as to the real gains from the intervention of NATO. In the course of the revolution in Libya, the west pressurized Gaddafi to resign; not to mention the assistance NATO rendered to the rebel National Transitional Forces, highlighting the realist motives of the NATO countries. The divisive personality of Gaddafi and its ripple effects on the politics of African leadership was also highlighted. In the end, it was clear that the NATO Humanitarian intervention in the name of R2P ended up as a regime change. Finally, the failure of UNSC Resolution 1973 to provide for reconstruction of Libya after the intervention resulted in a relapse of country into an even more complex chaotic state.