ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PROTRACTED POLICE RELATED DUTIES ON THE WARFIGHTING POSTURE OF THE GHANA ARMED FORCES

The rapidly evolving nature of global security threats requires states to maintain a robust national security framework. To address these threats, states may require their militaries to collaborate with civil authorities (CA) to enhance national security. This is evident in several states across Europe, Africa, and other regions facing IS challenges. The Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) is no exception and undertakes police-related duties (PRD) independently or jointly with the Ghana Police Service (GPS). PRD refers to the roles of militaries in IS traditionally performed by the GPS, such as managing civil disturbances and law enforcement. Examples of such Operations include CALM LIFE GONG GONG, COW LEG, PEACE TRAIL, and HALT, all of which are protracted. GAF PRO MAJ M TIJANI becomes protracted when it extends beyond short-term or emergency operations.

Articles 210(3) and 200(3) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana mandate the GAF with the primary role of defence and the GPS with maintaining law and order, respectively. Additionally, the National Security Council (NSC), through the Security and Intelligence Act, Act 1030, has also outlined measures on how GAF should be involved in PRD. However, these regulations are inconclusive as the Constitution of Ghana leaves the deployment of GAF at the discretion of the president. Furthermore, Act 1030 explicitly spells out how the GAF should be called in to assist the GPS but fails to indicate the conditions for GAF's withdrawal. This has led to most of GAF's PRD becoming protracted. These challenges, if not addressed, could undermine the GAF as a warfighting institution, affect GAF's warfighting posture and make GAF personnel timid and docile for war. Given this, the paper sought to identify how protracted PRD impacts the warfighting posture of the GAF to enhance operational effectiveness.

The impacts of protracted PRD on the GAF warfighting posture could be positive and negative. Positive impact of protracted PRD is enhanced IS and strengthened civil-military coordination (CIMIC). GAF's involvement in protracted PRD has assisted the GPS in managing civil unrest and addressing IS threats that could have destabilised the country. A case in point is Operation GONG GONG, where GAF's intervention and assistance to the GPS always ensure incidents do not escalate beyond control. Additionally, inter-agency collaboration with CA through PRD helps GAF in its external operations as modern operations and warfare are multi-domain and require the cooperation of the several agencies involved. On the other hand, the negative impacts include the erosion of GAF military identity and the strain on GAF logistics. PRD requires restraint which contrast with the aggression, decisiveness, and assertiveness demanded in warfare. Over time, a policing mindset becomes ingrained in soldiers. When soldiers become accustomed to PRD, they could become timid when engaging in high-tempo and aggressive operations, even when required for self-defence. Additionally, GAF relies heavily on logistics for its routine operations hence protracted PRD significantly burden these resources, which could have been used for training and creating reserves to enhance GAF's warfighting posture.

GAF faces several challenges in undertaking protracted PRD. These challenges include inconclusive regulatory frameworks, inadequate logistics and limited capacity of the GPS to undertake PRD effectively. Both the Constitution and the NSC directives are not explicit on the scope of employment of the GAF in PRD. The lack of clear directives for GAF's withdrawal from PRD contributes to the protracted nature of GAF PRD. Additionally, the logistics challenges could be attributed to limited budget allocations. Limited budget directly impacts logistics procurement and maintenance grants for the GAF. This consequentially impacts GAF's operational flexibility and equipment serviceability. Furthermore, GPS personnel lack certain operational skills due to the lack of extensive training to deal with certain counter-insurgency threats. This results in the GPS struggling to respond swiftly and efficiently to some IS challenges, hence requiring GAF intervention.

There is therefore the need for some strategic reforms to address the negative impacts and challenges of GAF involvement in protracted PRD. One measure is to limit GAF's involvement in PRD to emergencies. It is recommended that GHQ (JOps) coordinate with NSC to review existing PRD and establish conditions for GAF's withdrawal by Mar 25. Additionally, special logistics provisions could help GAF manage the demands of PRD without compromising the resources and equipment necessary for combat readiness. GAF could employ the logistics arrangement for peace support operations for PRD. Given this, it is recommended that GHQ (Log) and GHQ (PR&D) should coordinate with NSC to procure separate logistics for PRD by Jun 25. As an interim measure, all GAF Units should implement an effective equipment maintenance system as soon as possible. Lastly, providing clear mandates for PRD is essential due to inconclusive mandates in the Constitution and the directives by the NSC. Lessons could be drawn from South African Constitution, where all military engagement in PRD must be subjected to parliamentary approval. Following from above, it is recommended that the MoD to advocate for a constitutional review of articles on the GAF and other frameworks on GAF involvement in PRD during the next constitutional review. This would ensure GAF involvement in protracted PRD are regulated to help GAF focus on its primary roles and maintain a positive warfighting posture to deter external threats and protect Ghana's territorial sovereignty.